

# Applying Climate Psychology to Sustainable Mobility Behavioural Interventions

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# 1 Introduction

## What is this report?

This report is the culmination of a 3-month internship dedicated to formulating recommendations for BIT lenW on how climate psychology insights can be applied to sustainable mobility behavioural interventions. It outlines general insights that are universally relevant, applies these insights through a case study, and outlines overarching recommendations on how climate psychology insights can be applied in combination with existing behaviour change tools (e.g., behaviour change wheel) to improve interventions.

## Who is it for?

It is primarily for the BIT lenW Gedragsteam but has been written in a way that other behavioural experts and non-experts can still make use of it. It contains insights that can be useful for anyone working with behaviour change.




## 2 Climate psychology insights

### General insights

I began by researching climate psychology in general and what insights the current literature offers — without looking at it through the lens of sustainable mobility. I outline these insights which centred around four key problems and how they relate to each other — risk perception & affective responses, climate change denial, personal behaviours, and collective action & policy support. Figure 1 below depicts my conclusions based on the desk research about how these issues relate to each other.

Figure 1



While these issues did not end up forming the most important climate psychological insights, they nevertheless offered important perspectives to consider. For each problem, I present a general description, a list of causes categorised into individual and environmental sources, and potential solutions/insights.

Describing climate change denial, there are four main ways in which people deny climate change — existence denial, human cause denial, impact denial, and consensus denial (Björnberg et al., 2017; Clarke et al., 2019). There are related concepts such as environmental concern, individual resistance, and psychological distance (Van Lange & Huckleba, 2021). However, terms like psychological distance seem overly popular in climate psychology literature, therefore it is important to include the critical perspective that addressing psychological distance often does not have the impact that it is expected to (Van Valkengoed et al., 2023). The individual causes of climate change denial include the seven dragons of inaction put forth by Gifford (2011), which overlaps with research by Wong-Parodi and Feygina (2020). The environmental causes include the funding of climate change denial campaigns (Supran & Oreskes, 2017; Rust, 2019; Raval, 2021; Keane, 2020; Brigham, 2020), government denial (Samet & Woodward, 2018), status quo (Ferguson & Schmitt, 2021), and climate injustice due to group conflicts (Adams, 2021; Pearson et al., 2021). Proposed solutions/insights for climate change denial were categorised by the dragons of inaction. For example, to address ideological issues, research by Wolsko et al. (2016) showed that framing a message to emphasise moral grounds of obedience, purity and patriotism led to conservatives acting more pro-environmentally than liberals — evidencing that even groups typically against pro-environmental action can be persuaded to act this way if their values are emphasised in the interventions. Another important insight was that for

addressing social comparison, descriptive and injunctive norms should align with each other for their effect to be maximised (Young & Goldstein, 2021), with Nolan (2021) further providing a guide for the design and implementation of social norm interventions. As climate change denial is expected to influence both personal behaviours and collective action, these insights are important.

The second problem(s) of risk perception and affective response (considered in conjunction) involved the explanation of how the perception of personal relevance and severity, as well as affective response to climate information, influence personal behaviours, climate change denial, and collective action. The individual causes involve psychological distance being a barrier to the perception of personal relevance and severity, severity being downplayed to protect safe worldviews, lack of visible consequences in the immediate environment, disbelief in experts due to self-affirmation needs, and system justification tendencies (Pidgeon, 2012; Lee et al., 2015). Environmental causes include the effect of descriptive norms of inaction, funding of climate change denial, and government denial (Supran & Oreskes, 2017; Rust, 2019; Raval, 2021; Keane, 2020; Brigham, 2020; Samet & Woodward, 2018). As the causes overlap with the causes of climate change denial, so do too the solutions/insights. Some of the key solutions/insights were to address ideological barriers based on research by Wolsko et al. (2016), social norm barriers based on research by Young and Goldstein (2021) and Nolan (2021), and to elevate transformational narratives based on research by Ferguson and Schmitt (2021) to reduce perceived risk of change. This

overlap is beneficial as it allows for multiple issues to be tackled with the same strategies.

The third issue described was personal behaviours, referring to climate-related behaviours done by an individual, rather than as part of a group (although this line is blurry as groups are constructed of individuals). Personal and collective behaviours influence each other and there is an overall lack of personal pro-environmental climate behaviours. However, there is an issue of over-individualisation of climate psychology, whereby responsibility and blame is put on individuals over industry/government (sometimes even deliberately, see Solnit, 2021). The individual causes of lacking personal pro-climate behaviours involve risk perception & affective responses, climate change denial (and thus the dragons of inaction), and the concept of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation refers to the perception that the individual is in an unfair position compared to a reference person (which could be someone else or themselves at a different time). Higher relative deprivation leads to an increase in both personal and collective action, as well as policy support (Walker et al., 2015). Environmental causes include widespread narratives of climate change denial as well as the influence of social norms. While injunctive norms generally show that people should behave pro-environmentally, it is not enough as descriptive norms do not indicate that people are unequivocally behaving more pro-environmentally — causing a disconnect which fosters inaction. Solutions overlap with solutions for addressing climate change denial, risk perception and affective responses, with specific emphasis on social norm interventions as described by Nolan (2021).

The fourth problem is collective action (including policy support). This is defined as action done by a group or collective as opposed to just individual behaviour in one's private life. Due to the increased scale this has higher potential for impact than individual behaviours and is thus a key area to focus on. In conjunction with this, mass policy support is important as it leads to policy changes, which foster or mandate collective action. Causes for lacking collective action are traceable back to the issues of climate change denial (dragons of inaction), risk perception, affective responses, as well as personal behaviours. While social norms are highly influential for the behaviours of an individual, a group norm is an even stronger influence on the collective action of that particular group. In addition there is also the issue of social loafing and lacking collective efficacy, both which are additional barriers to collective action. These challenges, in addition to behavioural inertia, make it even more difficult to facilitate collective action than individual action — which is already difficult to facilitate. The majority of solutions of collective action overlap with the solutions for the other issues, but there is one concept that has the potential for bigger impact if leveraged — the concept of social tipping points.

### Social Tipping Points

For both personal and collective action, the concept of social tipping points has high potential for impact. Social tipping points occur when a group minority grows large enough so that the rest of the population converts their behaviour at an exponential and often unstoppable rate (Centola et al.,

2018). As personal and collective action are challenging to achieve, focusing efforts on just reaching the social tipping points has the potential to yield better results. Research has shown that social tipping points hover around the 25% mark of the population, meaning that when the minority grows to around 25% of the population, the group opinion can shift from the majority to the minority, which will then become the new majority (Milkoreit et al., 2018; Centola et al., 2018). As the process of reaching the social tipping point is a process of turning a minority into a majority, I looked to minority influence research to develop strategy and recommendations on reaching it.

### Minority Influence

Minority influence is the process where a group minority persuades and converts the group majority to adopt their opinion, thus becoming the new majority and changing the opinion of the group as a collective. Not only is this how social tipping points can be reached, but it is also how ground-up social change is achieved and is thus an important field for change in climate behaviour. Bolderdijk and Jans (2021) published a review about minority influence in climate change mitigation and presented three key paths of minority influence as well as some barriers against it. The insights outlined in this article formed a key part of my climate psychology research and recommendations for its application.

The first path by which minorities can convert majorities is changing the private opinion of the majority. By introducing deviant views, the minority trigger the majority to privately

reconsider their current opinion on the matter. This may not directly result in a change in visible action, but it can do so indirectly (by changing intention and consequently behaviour). This process is especially effective when the minority stick to a position consistently (i.e., they do not change their position) and with perseverance. The more the majority hear this same deviant view, the harder it is for them to ignore its existence. However, public action often lags behind private opinion, and therefore it is not enough to change private opinion in order to convert the majority's behaviour.

The second path of minority influence is changing norm perceptions. Norms are self-fulfilling, meaning if most people (majority) believe that most people eat meat (descriptive norm), then most people will continue to eat meat (behaviour). It is easy to get stuck in this self-perpetuating loop, but minorities can challenge this by demonstrating that an alternative behaviour is possible. It is important that the minority not only talk about the alternative behaviour, but physically display it. The awareness that a growing minority is deviating from the norm shows the majority that the current norm is vulnerable, less tight than previously thought, and likely to change in the future. This in turn incentivises the majority to also change their behaviour to align with the new emerging norm, as all group members have innate desires to conform to group norms. It is also important that the minority is perceived to be growing, otherwise they can be written off as peripheral deviants, unrepresentative of the group position and identity.

The third path of minority influence is offering social support to other deviants. It is difficult to dissent and deviate from a group norm, especially if one feels as if they would be alone in doing so. Offering social support for others to speak up and deviate makes it much more socially comfortable (and thus more likely) for group members to withstand majority pressure and deviate. There is safety in numbers and the more people deviate, the more psychological safety group members will feel in deviating. It is important here that allies are physically present, as this yields a much stronger effect than just hearing about the support online or through another medium. Additionally, it is more effective when minority members are prototypical group members rather than peripheral.

Two key barriers against minority influence are that it is a source of intragroup conflict and that frontrunners and “do-gooders” can elicit reactance and hostile responses in others. The lack of consensus due to deviance leads to intragroup conflict that must be resolved with the conformity of minority members, exclusion of minority members, or conversion of majority members. The last option is how minority influence can succeed. Importantly, frontrunners cause reactance in others due to implicitly questioning their moral integrity and altruistic reputation, counterproductively slowing social change. Change-makers thus often aim to avoid the reactance, but an interview with Reint Jan Renes from the Hogeschool van Amsterdam offered a different perspective on this.

[Dealing with reactance](#)

Reint Jan Renes offered the perspective that reactance is better than indifference, because disruption is necessary for change to occur (Renes & Barta, 2023). Without such disruption, behavioural inertia will prevail and change will be minimal at best. With this argument, reactance is a sign that an intervention is working and the process of change is happening. However, reactance still has negative effects as it can push people further away from the desired direction. This is where the concept of radical flank effects come in, with which reactance can not only be dealt with but actually leveraged for benefit. A radical flank effect occurs when the presence of a radical group (flank) makes a moderate group seem much more reasonable, thereby increasing people's support for the moderate group (Simpson et al., 2022). In this way, the moderate and radical groups complement and need each other. Without the radical group, the moderate will receive less support and thus less social change will occur. Without the moderate group, the radical will cause too much reactance and counterproductively push people further away from the desired position.

To conclude the most significant insights, social tipping points need to be reached in order to drive social change in personal and collective climate behaviours. Minority influence paths should be facilitated to reach the social tipping point of approximately 25% of the population. Disruption is necessary for this change to be possible, which can come from minorities in the form of frontrunners and activists. This can cause reactance, however by strategically adding a moderate option, the radical flank effect can be leveraged and thus social change boosted.



## 3 Case study: Leaving flying and car ownership behind

### Sustainable mobility directions

The application to sustainable mobility began with conducting background research on the target behaviours of reducing flying and car ownership. In short, the background research showed that only about 42% of Dutch people fly in a given year (whereas this is perceived to be much higher), that most trips are made for holidays, and that price and convenience are the most important reasons for choosing to fly (Zijlstra & Huibregtse, 2018). Reducing car ownership is technically two target behaviours in one as it includes both not buying a car and getting rid of existing cars. The background research showed that the motorisation rate in the Netherlands is relatively high, that car ownership is largely a result of necessity rather than choice, and that rural areas see much higher levels of car ownership than urban areas (Zijlstra et al., 2022). These two behaviours were deemed of high importance in sustainable mobility strategy.

objectives is an adaptation of a step in the Intervention Mapping technique that helps specify what specific changes need to be achieved to reach the end goal (Bartholomew Eldredge et al., 2016). This analysis is visible in full on the following pages.

### Behavioural analysis: Behaviour Change Wheel

Using the behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011), I conducted a behavioural analysis on both reducing flying and car ownership, including formulating change objectives for each relevant intervention function and matching corresponding policy categories. This formulation of change

## Reducing car ownership

Capability		Opportunity		Motivation	
Physical	Psychological	Physical	Social	Reflective	Automatic
<p>A large portion of the population has disabilities that restrict car use. Many already don't own a car because of this.</p>	<p>It is hard to 'unfreeze' a sticky habit like owning a car.</p> <p>Self-efficacy for being able to get by without a car is necessary.</p> <p>Cost of cars are underestimated due to hidden costs such as depreciation, maintenance, cleaning (lack of knowledge).</p> <p>Awareness of alternatives (e.g. share-car) is low.</p> <p>1/3 of Dutch see car ownership not as free choice but necessity.</p> <p>Living without a car is often a new type of behaviour needing to be learned.</p>	<p>Rural areas necessitate car use, and fuel car dependence (vicious cycle).</p> <p>Alternatives (e.g. share-car) are sparse.</p> <p>Extensive road network and parking spaces make car use easy.</p> <p>Complex traffic, delays, higher costs, less space in urban areas make car use harder. Opposite for rural.</p> <p>Proximity to workplaces, facilities, and alternative mobility (PT/bikes) make car use not necessary in urban areas. Opposite for rural.</p> <p>Living far from the workplace/PT, having a family, change of life phase lead to buying cars.</p>	<p>Majority of population (74%) own cars. Even higher in rural areas (and lower in urban areas). Strong descriptive norm of owning cars.</p> <p>Injunctive norm says car ownership is good (solves problems + social/financial status)</p> <p>Owning a car does not require explanation, while <i>not</i> owning a car does (opposite likely true in urban areas).</p> <p>NL boasts strong traditions of cycling and PT.</p> <p>Social proof of car-free state is abundant in urban areas and scarce in rural areas.</p>	<p>Cars provide comfort, protection from elements and strangers, space for passengers, ease of taking baggage, comfort/convenience of route/destination.</p> <p>Costs of cars are perceived lower than alternatives (for an individual, this is wrong).</p> <p>The climate problem of cars is impersonal and psychologically distant.</p> <p>Most people care about climate change but this is less important than issues of mobility and finance.</p> <p>Sufficient finances should be a condition for car ownership but is often not the case (necessity is more important).</p>	<p>There is positive association with car ownership for solving the personal mobility problem (also: holidays, family time, personal affinity).</p> <p>Car ownership is a sticky habit, once you have the car it is unlikely you will get rid of it.</p>

### Change objectives by intervention function (cars)

Education	Persuasion	Incentivisation	Coercion	Training	Restriction	Environmental restructuring	Modelling	Enablement
<p>Increase knowledge about using alternatives and climate impact of cars</p> <p>Highlight hidden costs of cars</p> <p>Increase fiscal responsibility</p>	<p>Increase self-transcendence and climate impact importance</p> <p>Increase consideration of alternatives</p> <p>Worsen attitudes towards car ownership</p>	<p>Reward choosing alternatives over private cars</p> <p>Reward not buying or getting rid of cars</p>	<p>Punish choosing cars over alternatives</p> <p>Punish buying or keeping a car</p>	<p>Increase skills in breaking habits</p> <p>Increase self-efficacy for living without a car</p> <p>Increase skills in finding and using alternatives</p>	<p>Mandate presence of alternatives</p> <p>Restrict parking spaces</p> <p>Perpetuate official stance of 'anti-cars'</p>	<p>Use prompts to trigger consideration of alternatives</p> <p>Prioritise alternatives when route-searching</p> <p>Increase salience of car-free citizens and decrease salience of car users</p> <p>Promote injunctive norm that cars are harmful</p>	<p>Demonstrate success and benefit of prototypical group member not having a car</p>	<p>Make education programmes on alternatives accessible</p> <p>Make car ownership socially uncomfortable</p> <p>Make using alternatives easy and pleasant</p> <p>Help people break their car-owning habit</p>
Policy categories to achieve these change objectives								
Communication, guidelines, service provision	Communication, guidelines, service provision	Communication, fiscal, legislation	Communication, fiscal, legislation	Guidelines, service provision	Guidelines, regulation, legislation	Guidelines, regulation, environmental/social planning	Communication	Guidelines, fiscal, regulation, legislation, service provision

## Reducing flying

Capability		Opportunity		Motivation	
Physical	Psychological	Physical	Social	Reflective	Automatic
<p>Most people who are able to fly are also able to get on a train/bus instead.</p>	<p>Knowledge about alternatives (e.g. train/bus) is not as prominent as knowledge about flights.</p> <p>Good technological skills are required to be able to compare flights with alternatives as the information is scattered online.</p> <p>Self-efficacy about being able to reduce flying is necessary.</p>	<p>Trains/busses are much more expensive (if they exist at all) than flights to the same destination</p> <p>Train/bus tickets that are very expensive can be out of reach for disadvantaged groups.</p> <p>Trains/busses take much longer (often 10x longer!) than flights to get to the destination.</p> <p>The highest emitting flights (4000km+) are especially hard to replace with sustainable alternatives (such alternatives are rarely commercially available).</p> <p>Alternatives do exist for many destinations.</p> <p>Closer destinations are available for holiday.</p>	<p>Strong descriptive norm that 'everyone flies' (even though 42% of NL does not).</p> <p>In most places, there are no social barriers to flying (it is seen as fun, exciting, associated with holidays).</p> <p>Places with social barriers such as flight-shame have seen many people reduce their flying.</p>	<p>Flights are cheaper, more convenient, faster, and limit your destination options far less than the alternatives.</p> <p>Awareness of carbon emission effects is present but less about the specific climate impact of flights; not sufficient to override the practical benefits.</p> <p>Self-transcendence positively predicts, while self-interest and apathy negatively predict pro-environmental action.</p>	<p>There is a strong association between going on holiday and flying as it is the main way people get to holiday destinations (going on holiday = flying).</p> <p>This also results in positive affect towards flying as it is associated with holidays (a good time).</p> <p>Anger towards politicians/celebrities who fly a lot heavily limits desire to reduce personal flying.</p>

Change objectives by intervention function (flying)

Education	Persuasion	Incentivisation	Coercion	Training	Restriction	Environmental restructuring	Modelling	Enablement
Increase knowledge about alternatives to flights and climate impact of flying	Increase self-transcendence and climate impact importance  Increase consideration of alternatives  Worsen attitudes towards flying	Reward choosing alternatives over flying	Punish choosing flying over alternatives	Increase skills in finding/comparing alternatives  Increase self-efficacy for reducing flying	Make alternatives much cheaper than flights  Restrict long-haul holiday and business flights  Perpetuate flight shame	Highlight monetary and emissions savings when booking alternatives  Show door-to-door travel time  Prioritise recommending alternatives and closer destinations	Show default travel option as the alternatives  Show people's commitment to not flying and negative flying associations	Make education programmes on alternatives accessible  Make flying socially uncomfortable  Make booking alternatives easy and pleasant
<b>Policy categories to achieve these change objectives</b>								
Communication, guidelines, service provision	Communication, guidelines	Communication, fiscal, legislation	Communication, fiscal, legislation	Guidelines, service provision	Guidelines, regulation, legislation	Guidelines, regulation, environmental/social planning	Communication	Guidelines, fiscal, regulation, legislation, service provision

## From BCW to Climate Insights

These analyses showed that while capability was a relevant factor, the opportunities and motivations were more significant factors in each of these behaviours. The challenges in opportunities make the impact of strictly behavioural interventions difficult, but there is still a possibility to have an influence. Up until this point, the regular behaviour change process has been utilised. It is from here that the climate psychology insights were applied — showing how these insights should not replace existing tools and processes but rather should add value to them. The behavioural analyses and climate psychology insights were then combined to develop ideas for behavioural interventions.

## Intervention Ideas: Reducing Flying

For reducing flying, the ideas I came up with were feedback messaging, a multi-search website, a poster campaign, influencer videos, a flight-free challenge, and an emissions tracking app. Feedback messaging would be applied on train and bus company websites, where the ticket prices would be accompanied by messaging that highlights both emissions savings and monetary savings when choosing 'green' mobility over flying. Messages saying that other people recently booked this trip would also be displayed. This does however partially depend on the alternatives being cheaper than flying, which is a key structural issue that needs to be addressed. This addresses the behavioural factors of positive associations with flying, financial motivation, and loss aversion, while also perpetuating the minority's views that using alternatives over flying is better and shows that others

are already doing this. A multi-search website would allow users to search for a route to a destination with flights, busses and trains all in one website. This would expose flyers to the alternatives while also using the feedback messaging. Popularising the website would increase interaction between the minority and majority, spread the minority views, and make it easy for users to see how they can reduce their travel emissions. It is also a moderate option as it is still possible to find flights, it is just disincentivised. The poster campaign and influencer videos would perpetuate the social norm that less than half of Dutch people fly in a year, that flying is very damaging to the environment, offer social support to others to fly less, provide role models (minority leaders) to follow, demonstrate the changing norm, and offer a moderate option. The flight-free challenge is an opportunity for participants to pledge not to fly for a three-month period, which is short enough to be doable yet long enough to be a challenge for many. It would increase people's self-efficacy, positive attitude towards reducing flying, sense of community and social support from other non-fliers, make dissenters and allies physically visible, perpetuate the changing norm, and offer a moderate alternative of temporary flight-free status. Lastly, the emissions tracking app would track a person's personal emissions from flying and compare it to emissions of others in the neighbourhood and friends, creating a game and competition of who can get the lowest emissions. It uses effective methods of individualisation, gamification and social comparison (among others) to increase positive attitudes towards reducing flying, make others' reducing behaviour more visible and show how others reduce their flying. Creating a

radical group is not necessary because activists for giving up flying already exist and are very visible in the media.

very wide audience, boosting the process of minority influence.

### Intervention Ideas: Reducing Car Ownership

The ideas I came up with for reducing car ownership were an emissions tracking app, a car-free challenge, a poster campaign and influencer videos. These ideas and their benefits overlap with reducing flying due to some shared characteristics. The emissions tracking app would track the emissions from the user's specific car and routes taken and compare these to friends and others in the neighbourhood to create social comparison. It can also provide alternative transport options (e.g., bike or public transport), thereby directly showing users how they can replace their car journey with a more sustainable one. It also increases positive attitudes towards reducing car use, makes others' reducing behaviour more visible and perpetuates the minority view. The car-free challenge involves participants (both car owners and non-owners) pledging to not use cars for a three-month period. This would facilitate interaction between minority and majority groups, increase people's self-efficacy, positive attitude towards reducing cars, sense of community and social support from other deviants, make deviants and allies physically visible, perpetuate the changing norm, and offer a moderate alternative of temporary car-free status. The poster campaign and influencer videos would popularise alternatives, perpetuate the notion that cars are very damaging to the environment, offer social support to others to drive less, provide role models (minority leaders) to follow, demonstrate the changing norm, and offer a moderate option. The influencers as role models can reach a

## 4 Recommendations for application

This research led to the formulation of three main recommendations for applying climate psychology insights to sustainable mobility behavioural interventions. While they have been developed for sustainable mobility, they are not exclusive to this and can easily be adapted to other topics. The recommendations are **(1) to use climate psychology insights to complement existing behaviour change tools, (2) to facilitate the three paths of minority influence, and (3) to embrace reactance and leverage the radical flank effect.**

### (1) Use climate psychology insights to complement existing behaviour change tools

Climate psychology insights should not replace existing behaviour change tools. It is easy to only focus on addressing climate change denial, minority influence paths, or radical flank effects. But this would overlook the nuances of each behavioural problem and result in overly generic and low-impact solutions. Tools like the behaviour change wheel are still needed to conduct thorough behavioural analyses and tailor behavioural interventions to maximise the enacted change. Climate psychology insights can add to this by offering a broader strategic direction as well as a concrete tool to facilitate the change. For example, feedback messaging addresses the important behavioural factors of affective associations with flying and financial motivation, while also perpetuating the minority's views that flight alternatives are better and the norm that many are already

choosing alternatives over flights. These techniques and insights should be combined in this way.

### (2) Facilitate the three paths of minority influence

The three paths of minority influence are evidence-based paths of getting a small group minority to grow, convert a majority, and reach a social tipping point. These are generic paths that can easily be applied and adapted to any target behaviour. Changing private opinions, shifting norm perceptions, and offering social support will grow the minority steadily to reach the social tipping point, while using prototypical group members as role models can significantly boost this process. Group members look and listen more to prototypical than peripheral group members, and policy/interventions can be designed to empower such group members which can be an efficient way to reach many individuals in a trickle-down manner. Policy/interventions should also contribute by perpetuating the deviant views, norms, and offer widespread social support to the dissenting minority (top-down support for the bottom-up change).

### (3) Embrace reactance, leverage radical flank effects

Lastly, reactance should be embraced and the radical flank effect leveraged. Disruption is necessary for change. Especially such radical change as what is needed for effective



climate mitigation and adaptation. This will result in reactance, but this can and should be leveraged for benefit by strategically placing a moderate alternative. Therefore, this reactance should be seen as a sign of success, that change can happen, as opposed to a liability. Additionally, radicals already exist in many climate-related behaviours in the forms of activists, and simply placing moderate alternatives in proximity will make the moderates seem much more reasonable and enticing. This way, governmental institutions do not have to facilitate the radical entities themselves but can still benefit from their presence, also making it easier to realise in a practical/political sense.

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