



ENHANCING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

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Motivation




BUSINESS | EUROPE

Will EU oil embargo really hurt Russian war machine?

Ashutosh Pandey
12/05/2022

The EU has stopped buying Russian seaborne crude oil as it seeks to deprive Moscow of a key revenue source fueling its war in Ukraine. The move will hurt Russia but not as much as the bloc would have liked.



NEWS


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Ukraine war: More than 60% of Putin's war chest frozen, Truss says

9 April 2022 · Comments

Russia-Ukraine war



Switzerland

Even historically neutral Switzerland is adopting the EU's sanctions against Russia, President Ignazio Cassis announced Monday. The country, which is a major center for wealthy Russian oligarchs, said it's freezing the assets of certain individuals "with immediate effect."



Patric Schindler/KeyStone/AP

Swiss Federal President Ignazio Cassis speaks during a press conference in Bern, Switzerland, Monday, February 28.

The sanctions and asset freeze will apply to Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Switzerland affirmed its commitment to neutrality and said it will examine further EU sanctions on a "case-by-case basis."

"Russia's unprecedented military attack on a sovereign European country was the deciding factor in the Federal Council's decision to change its previous stance on

sanctions," a statement said.



NEWS


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War in Ukraine: West hits Russia with oil bans and gas curbs

9 March 2022

Russia-Ukraine war



The Current Study

- RQ: *Can public support for sanctions be enhanced through sanctioning regime design, or through framing of the domestic costs of such sanctions?*
- Context: the **war in Ukraine**, international **sanctions on Russia** (oil, gas, and coal embargo)
- 2 experimental studies, representative samples Germany and Poland (N=1,152/1,117), May 2022



Study 1

- Conjoint experiment
- Sanctioning regime design
- Choice between pairs of sanctioning regimes

Embargo	Proposal A	Proposal B
Further decrease in Russia's GDP by	6%	3%
Increase in prices of energy by	10%	50%
Aid programs aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the embargo	Cash benefits to all households	Lower energy taxes
Increase in prices of gasoline and diesel fuel by	100%	10%
Increase in unemployment rate by	0.5 percentage points	0.75 percentage points
Countries imposing the embargo	Poland and Germany	Poland and Germany
Replacing energy produced from Russian fossil fuels with	Nuclear energy produced domestically	Coal energy produced domestically

Study 1

The different elements of the sanctioning regime (attributes and their levels)


Attribute	Levels
Increase in prices of gasoline and diesel fuel by	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10% ▪ 25% ▪ 50% ▪ 100%
Increase in prices of energy by	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10% ▪ 25% ▪ 50% ▪ 100%
Increase in unemployment rate by	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 0.5 percentage points ▪ 0.75 percentage points ▪ 1 percentage points ▪ 1.5 percentage points
Further decrease in Russia's GDP by	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1% ▪ 3% ▪ 6% ▪ 10%
Aid programs aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the embargo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cash benefits to low-income households ▪ Cash benefits to all households ▪ Lower energy taxes ▪ No aid program in place
Replacing energy produced from Russian fossil fuels with	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Nuclear energy produced domestically ▪ Renewable energy produced domestically ▪ Coal energy produced domestically ▪ Energy imports from other countries
Countries imposing the embargo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All European Union member states ▪ Germany, Poland, France, Spain and Italy ▪ Germany and Poland ▪ Germany/Poland



Study 1

Results (aspect-support)

Sanctioning aspect	↑	Support
Domestic costs		↓
Target's costs		↑
Aid programs		↑
Sustainable energy substitutes		↑
# Sanctioning countries		↑



Study 2

- Information provision experiment
- Updating believes
 - Baseline average estimated GDP loss: 12.2% / 14.2% (PL/DE)
- Framing of domestic costs
- Self-report + behavioral measures

Study 2

Experimental intervention

Experimental group	Intervention (information)
Control group	No information
Update beliefs	... the immediate and full embargo on Russian oil, gas and coal would generate economic losses no greater than [1%/3%] of GDP over the course of one year.
Domestic context	... For comparison , in 2020 when the economy was hit by COVID-19 crisis , the economic loss in [Poland/Germany] amounted to 6% of GDP .
External context	... For comparison , the Russian economy would experience a further decline of minimum 10% of GDP ...

Study 2

Self-report measure

- Perception: “The **potential economic costs** for the [Polish/German] economy of the immediate and full embargo on Russian oil, gas and coal are **too high**”
- Support: “The government **should introduce** the immediate and full **embargo** on Russian oil, gas and coal”
- (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree)




Study 2

Self-report measure: results


*“The potential economic costs for the [Polish/German] economy of the immediate and full embargo on Russian oil, gas and coal are **too high**”*

Country ● Germany ■ Poland



*“The government **should introduce** the immediate and full embargo on Russian oil, gas and coal”*



Country ● Germany ■ Poland





Study 2

Behavioral measure: results



Conclusions

- The **design** of the sanctioning regime **matters** for public **support**
- Different domestic policies can **enhance support** for the sanctions
- “**Correction**” of perceived domestic costs may **enhance reported** support for sanctions
- This support did not translate into action
- **Contrasting** the costs of sanctions with other costs **did not** have an additional effect.

Limitations and future research

- Other contexts
- Other countries
- Behavioral measure, why did not work?
 - People indeed do not want to take action
 - People did not believe in the effectiveness of the NGOs
 - Supporting through no objection easier than active support?



Thank you for your attention!
Q&A